The Morgenthau Plan
David Irving's Introduction to the Morgenthau Plan http://www.fpp.co.uk/bookchapters/Morgenthau.html
[THE SMALL PRINT: This is a copyright work. The manuscript is reproduced as part of the Focal Point Publications Website. While it can be downloaded for personal use, the manuscript may not be marketed or commercially traded. ©1986 David Irving.]
THIS VOLUME reproduces in full the 22-page Morgenthau Plan for the first time. [Not yet reproduced on this site. This is just the editor's Introduction].
THE PEOPLE INVOLVED
THE BITTER ATMOSPHERE
MORGENTHAU VISITS EUROPE
MORGENTHAU MEETS EISENHOWER
THE MEETING WITH CHURCHILL
MORGENTHAU'S OTHER MEETINGS IN ENGLAND
MORGENTHAU RETURNS TO WASHINGTON
It also prints a selection of key British and American documents relating to the plan, although the story is still incomplete: many parts of the British foreign office files relating to it are still closed to public inspection, an exception to the general thirty-year rule.
The Morgenthau Plan, more formally known as the Treasury Plan for the Treatment of Germany, was devised by Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White and Secretary Henry R. Morgenthau Jr. in the summer of 1944. Morgenthau had just visited the battlefields of Normandy and spoken with General Dwight D Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, then arrived in Britain for talks with Mr Winston Churchill, the British prime minister and his advisers.
While important elements of the Plan, including the subtle re-education of the Germans by their own refugees and the dismantling of German heavy industry to aid British exports, were indeed put into effect, in the directive 1067 which the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff finally issued to Eisenhower, the main parts of the Morgenthau Plan, including orders to liquidate entire classes of suspected Nazi war criminals upon simple identification, and to leave the German nation to 'stew in its own juice,' were not formally implemented.
The Morgenthau Plan would have led to the death by starvation and pestilence of ten million Germans in the first two years after the war, in addition to the one million who had been killed in the saturation bombing and the three million killed in the enforced expulsion from Germany's eastern territories.
The Plan, enthusiastically adopted by German-born Lord Cherwell (Professor Friedrich A. Lindemann, Churchill's close friend, economic, strategic and scientific adviser), was pushed through at the Quebec summit conference between Roosevelt and Churchill on September 15, 1944.
It was part of the price that Churchill and Cherwell were willing to pay for a broad package of American concessions over which Morgenthau had political control including further Lend-lease aid (Phase II) to the British Empire after the war; moreover Mr Churchill needed his support on military issues including joint British strategic control of the atomic bomb (the Hyde Park agreement which was signed on September 18, 1944) and Britain's participation in the war in the Pacific. We can only speculate about Harry Dexter White's purpose in canvassing a plan which would have ruined the largest country in Central Europe, the last bastion that would protect Western Europe from the Red Army in post-war years.
The memorandum endorsing the plan's objectives was initialled (Okayed) by F.D.R. and W.C. on September 15, 1944.
The Plan caused immediate controversy. Hearing that it had been initialled at Quebec, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War (Kriegsminister), made bitter comments about the Semites in his unpublished private diary. Anthony Eden, British foreign secretary (1940-1945).and later prime minister, dismissed Morgenthau's and Lord Cherwell's lobbying, in a hitherto unpublished document, as a piece of gratuitous impertinence: 'These ex-Germans,' wrote Eden, 'seem to wish to wash away their ancestry in a bath of hate. A.E. Nov 19.'
When details of the Morgenthau Plan leaked to the press in America, angry British politicians demanded to know if Churchill had indeed signed such a document.
In 1953, after the F.B.I. levelled Soviet spy charges against the plan's
co-author, Herry Dexter White, Sir Winston Churchill sent to Lord Cherwell a
letter behind which was all the anxiety and guilt of a great man who realizes he
has been duped.
* * * * *
Much still remains to be revealed about the Morgenthau Plan. Dr Joseph Goebbels,
Nazi propaganda minister, made enough capital from it to inflict tens of
thousands of extra casualties on British and American troops in the battles that
followed its publication, and in the autumn 1944 U.S. presidential election
campaign Roosevelt's opponent Thomas Dewey lost no time in pointing this out.
'The publishing of this Plan,' claimed Dewey, 'was as good as ten fresh German
divisions.'
Coming under increasing fire, Morgenthau wrote around his fellow ministers,
appealing for support. Telephoning Henry Stimson on November 4, 1944, to 'urge
him to do something,' he found the Kriegsminister too busy cooking the official
records to cleanse Roosevelt of any implication in quite another scandal. 'He
sounded more tired than ever. Said he was tired out from working the last two
weeks on Pearl Harbor report to keep out anything that might hurt the Pres.'
Clever forgeries, prettying-up of official files after the event: this is why
historians who rely only on printed volumes are likely to be misled. For this
reason, it is important that my full dossier on the infamous Morgenthau Plan
should be published in facsimile, to enable future generations of Germans to
distinguish between the fantasies of Nazi propagan- dists and the total truth of
1944-1945. David Irving, London, June 1985
THE PEOPLE INVOLVED
CHERWELL,(1886-1957)faddish, teetotal personal adviser to Churchill from 1940;
Paymaster General 1943-45, 1951-53. Had a knack of putting complicated matters
in terms intelligible to Winston. When Cherwell became Paymaster General on
December 31, 1942 Oliver Harvey aptly summed him up: 'He is a somewhat sinister
figure who under the guise of scientific adviser puts up a lot of reactionary
stuff.' Henry Stimson, asked if he knew the Prof, acidly replied: 'I'm not sure
whether that means the Professor or the Prophet. We in the War Department know
him only as an old fool who loudly proclaimed that we could never cross the
Channel and also that when the robots [V-weapons] came they could never do any
damage!'
In Admiral Leahy's personal file on 'White, Harry D.' is a document entitled, 'Publicity in regard to Harry D. White, one time Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,' November 1953. According to this the Attorney General had announced that on February 20, 1946 the F.B.I. gave to White House officials including Leahy a report of White's association with Soviet agents.
Leahy noted, 'I have no recollection of having seen or heard of such a report
at any time.' His only contact with White, in connection with Britain's request
for Lend Lease, had been at a meeting on November 18, 1944.
THE BITTER ATMOSPHERE
In June and July 1944, Roosevelt and other leading Americans had begun dropping
remarks about their plans for Germany and the Germans. On June 7, entertaining
the Polish prime minister Mikolajczyk at the White House, Roosevelt had related
with round eyes remarks made by Stalin about his plans to 'liquidate 50,000
German officers.' In fact when Churchill tried to persuade Stalin to adopt such
a plan, to his annoyance Stalin insisted on fair and proper trials in every
case.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower had similar views. He told British ambassador Lord Halifax on July 10, 1944, that he felt the enemy leaders should be 'shot while trying to escape.' Imprisonment was not enough for the 3,500 officers of the German general staff. Lieutenant-Commander Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, noted in a secret diary: 'There was agreement that extermination could be left to nature if the Russians had a free hand.' Why just the Russians?, inquired Eisenhower they could temporarily assign zones in Germany to the smaller nations with old scores to settle.
Stimson felt that it would be wise to allow the British to occupy Northern Germany, because that was where much liquidation would be effected. 'I felt,' recorded the Republican Kriegsminister obliquely in his diary, 'that repercussions would be sure to arise which would mar the page of our history if we, whether rightly or wrongly, seemed to be responsible.' If the Americans occupied southern Germany, it would keep them away from Russia during the occupation period: 'Let her do the dirty work,' he suggested to the President, 'but don't father it.'
After a discussion with General George C Marshall on the punishment of
Hitler, the Gestapo and the S.S., Stimson wrote in his diary, 'I found around
me, particularly Morgenthau, a very bitter atmosphere of personal resentment
against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt. of the
Nazis.'
MORGENTHAU VISITS EUROPE
In July 1944 General George C. Marshall had informed Eisenhower that Henry R.
Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, and a party of experts were planning
a trip to investigate currency problems in France. Eisenhower replied that there
was nothing to be learned in the little strip of land which his armies then
controlled 'which is divided about equally between
fighting fronts and a solid line of depots, with two main lateral roads
completely filled with double columns of motor transport.'
Privately he added that these VIP trips were a pain in the neck. There just was not the space for visitors: Bradley's only accommodation consisted of one trailer and a couple of Jeeps, while Montgomery 'usually simply refuses to see unwelcome visitors.' He could hardly have made himself plainer. But Morgenthau had Roosevelt's ear, so Eisenhower had no choice but to humor him.
On the transatlantic flight Morgenthau's chief assistant Harry Dexter White slipped to him a copy of the report by the Washington interdepartmental Foreign Economic Policy Committee on postwar policy toward Germany. It shocked Morgenthau. As drafted, it would leave Germany more powerful in five or ten years than she had been before the war. Colonel Bernard Bernstein, financial adviser (G-5) at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), took Eisenhower's special train to meet Morgenthau's party in Scotland.
Morgenthau's son was also there when Morgenthau stepped off the C-54 at Prestwick, Scotland, on August 6 -- Eisenhower's chief of staff Bedell Smith had secured a comfortable army appointment for him. (There was to be 'no mention whatsoever, at any time, about his son nor photographs including his son,' Morgenthau's aide had stipulated.
On the long train journey down to London, Bernstein expressed concern to
White and Morgenthau about SHAEF's proposed handbook for American officers in
the future military government of Germany: it was too soft, he said; little was
being done to make Germany suffer. On the contrary, SHAEF's experts seemed to be
preparing for Germany's smooth return to the family of nations. Army directives
were being prepared to occupy, 'take over and control' Civil Affairs in Germany.
Evidently, said Bernstein, the Allies were to assume responsibility for
Germany's welfare, and 'even [sic] ensure that the Germans received medical care
and treatment.'
MORGENTHAU MEETS
EISENHOWER
They could not have picked a worse day for their visit.
Hitler's counterattack
against Patton and Bradley began during the night. They lunched on August 7 at
Ike's Portsmouth command post. According to Morgenthau's version, General
Eisenhower also strongly opposed any soft line on Germany: 'The whole German
population is a synthetic paranoid,' he told the Treasury Secretary. 'And there
is no reason for treating a paranoid gently. The best cure is to let the Germans
stew in their own juice.'
Ike's female assistant Kay Summersby eavesdropped and wrote in her diary afterwards: 'Secretary Morgenthau and party for lunch. Quite concerned about post war policies in Germany and particularly anxious that we do not establish rates of exchange that might favour Germany.' (Morgenthau was proposing to inflict a punitive rate of exchange on Germany, which would bankrupt her for all time, rendering her unable to rise again and make another war.)
This prompted the Supreme Commander to enlarge on his own views about the enemy, which he himself later quoted as follows: 'The German people must not be allowed to escape a personal sense of guilt.. Germany's war-making power should be eliminated. Certain groups should be specifically punished.. The German General Staff should be utterly eliminated. All records destroyed and individuals scattered and rendered powerless to operate as body.'
It was, claimed Morgenthau, Eisenhower who instilled in him the idea of a harsh treatment of the Germans. Eisenhower would later deny this, or plead loss of memory, but reporting this to his own staff on August 12, Morgenthau said: 'General Eisenhower had stated, and given the Secretary permission to repeat to others, that in his view we must take a tough line with Germany as we must see to it that Germany was never again in a position to unleash war upon the world.' He added, 'The Prime Minister had indicated his general concurrence with General Eisenhower's viewpoint.' And on August 19 he would tell President Roosevelt that Eisenhower 'is perfectly prepared to be tough with the Germans when he first goes in.' Morgenthau said that he had told the general, 'All the plans in G-5 are contrary to that view.'
On August 10, Churchill's diary showed a lunch appointment with Henry Morgenthau.
Churchill had longer-term worries than the future of Germany. He had at last woken up to the long term cost of the war to the Empire. Britain's indebtedness would soon be $3,000m; her exports were less than one-third of their 1938 level; to maintain full employment she must increase exports fivefold. So she must start rebuilding her export trade now which Americans might not understand. But Britain must release labor to rebuild her export industries. So Lend-Lease must continue even after Hitler's defeat, though a reduction of about twenty-seven percent would appear reasonable to the British. (, discussion FDR/WSC, September 14, in Morgenthau diary and copy in General Hap H. Arnold diary; and. W. D. Taylor, memo on meeting of Sir John Anderson and Sir David Waley with Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, August 11.)
Over lunch on August 10, they sized each other up. Churchill knew that Morgenthau was no friend of Britain. Morgenthau flattered Roosevelt a few days later that it was interesting 'how popular he [Roosevelt] was with the soldiers and how unpopular Churchill was.' He described one instance to Roosevelt: 'I told him [Roosevelt],' he wrote in his diary, 'about the difficulty of finding someone to take me through the shelters [in the East End of London] because both Churchill and Sir Robert Morris [?Home Secretary Mr Herbert Morrison] had been jeered when they went through them recently, and that finally they decided on Mrs Churchill and Lady Mountbatten.' Morgenthau amused Roosevelt's Cabinet a week later with a description of how the prime minister 'kept referring to his age during conversations.'
At the meeting between Churchill and Morgenthau the small-talk was as frigid as only an interview between a penniless debtor and his banker can be. 'Churchill,' described Morgenthau to Roosevelt, '.. started the conversation by saying that England was broke.. Churchill's attitude was that he was broke but not depressed about England's future.. He is going to tell Parliament about their financial condition at the right time after the Armistice, and that when he does that he is through.'
Churchill said that he had heard that Morgenthau was unfriendly towards Britain.
Morgenthau denied this, was brutally frank. Churchill must put his cards on the table. He must appoint a committee to consider financial questions, and then tell Parliament the facts.
When told of this, Churchill quailed at the idea. Roosevelt retorted, 'Oh, he is taking those tactics now. More recently his attitude was that he wanted to see England through the peace.'
Still, the revelation that Churchill had bankrupted Britain startled him. 'I had no idea,' he told Morgenthau. 'This is very interesting,' he sneered. 'I had no idea that England was broke. I will go over there and make a couple of talks and take over the British Empire.'
Morgenthau gave a similar version of their conversation to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 'The Prime Minister stated,' he told Anderson on August 11, 'that he did not wish to bring this matter into the open while our combined war effort in Europe was at its height.' Churchill was prepared to speak to Parliament about the straitened financial outlook, but not just yet. Morgenthau's view was that, under the circumstances, Churchill ought to take it up directly with the President.
Reporting to Roosevelt a few days later Morgenthau said, 'In England you can see the thing much clearer. There are two kinds of people there: One like Eden who believes we must cooperate with Russia, and that we must trust Russia for the peace of the world, 'at which point FDR said he belonged to the same school as Eden' -- and there is the other school which is illustrated by the remark of Mr Churchill who said, "What are we going to have between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?"'
Churchill was beginning to hint at the need for a strong postwar Germany, and
Morgenthau did not like the sound of that at all. Roosevelt replied that he
hoped to see Churchill soon, even though the Prime Minister was 'not his own
master in some important matters, being overridden frequently by the Foreign
Office.' (Memo Robert A. Lovett to Stimson, Aug 18, 1944: Stimson papers.)
One other topic was discussed at No.10 Downing Street. Morgenthau shortly told
Zionist leaders that the Prime Minister had assured him that, as was well known,
his sympathy was still for Zionism and Zionist aspirations: that 'it was simply
a matter of timing as to when he would give the Jews their State in Palestine.'*
* U.S. Dept of State record of visit by Dr Nahum Goldmann, September 13, 1944: US embassy files, London, 710 Arab-Jewish relations.)
MORGENTHAU'S OTHER MEETINGS IN ENGLAND
Turning his back on the unpleasant truth of Britain's bankruptcy, Mr Churchill
had literally flown taking off late on August 10 to tour British headquarters in
the Mediterranean.
Remaining in England, on August 12 and 13 Morgenthau tried to analyse Churchill's political attitude with U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant and Anthony Eden. In England, he again said, he saw several groups: a pro-Soviet group around Eden, favoring harsh treatment of Germany, including dismemberment. A second, dangerous group favoured Germany's economic restoration as a bulwark against the Soviet Union; and a third group, mid-way, preferring a strong Europe as a whole, aligned with Britain. Morgenthau inquired where Churchill lay, and Eden hesitatingly admitted that Churchill was probably in that third group. Winant agreed: Churchill now had 'certain reservations' against the Soviet Union, but he could still be persuaded that it was desirable to continue the grisly Three Power agreement reached at Teheran on the future of Germany. Anyway, Winant was confident that Churchill would go along with Roosevelt in any program. Morgenthau expressed to Eden his personal concern that there were Allied officials aiming to restore Germany's economy as quickly as possible. Eden expressed surprise as it ran counter to the Teheran agreements. Stalin, he claimed, was determined to smash Germanyto dismember herso that she could never again disrupt Europe.
'Eden,' noted Harry Dexter White, 'said Roosevelt had agreed with Stalin, but Churchill was at first reluctant to accede. He (Churchill) was willing to make Austria independent and to take East Prussia away, but was doubtful about going beyond that.' Eden added that after talking it over with him Churchill decided to go along with Roosevelt and Stalin on this. Eden felt it important to pursue a tough policy on Germany, 'as nearly in accord with Russian policy toward Germany as possible,' if only to reassure Stalin of Britain's good intentions. It was an interesting statement, and Morgenthau asked him to repeat it. Eden obliged. 'He [Morgenthau] said [to Eden] that in his conversation with Churchill the question of the program to be followed upon occupation of Germany had come up and that he had gathered from the Prime Minister's comments that he was in agreement with the view expressed by Morgenthau, to the effect that during the early months Germany's economy ought to be let pretty much alone and permitted to seek its own level.'
This was the origin of what Morgenthau later called leaving the Germans to 'stew in their own juice.'
Morgenthau now talked with Anderson alone. Until now the Chancellor had lifted the veil on Britain's bankrupt future only slightly in Parliament, he admitted, in opening the talks with the U.S. Treasury officials on August 11: so his coming budget message about Britain's bleak post-war future was going to shock Parliament and people. 'Financially,' summarized one Treasury official, 'England has thrown everything into the war effort regardless of consequences. It is well known throughout the country that England has gone into the war on the basis of "unlimited liability"; the consequences of such financial action, however, have not been weighed nor understood by the country. He stated that England would emerge from the war with high international and national prestige, but in a deplorable financial position. The period of the war would have seen England's transition from a position of the world's largest creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation.'
When Morgenthau visited him on August 15 Eden read out to him selected extracts
of the Teheran conference between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. namely those
extracts dealing with Germany. Roosevelt said that he wanted to discuss the
partition of Germany. Germany could be divided into three or fifteen parts, he
said. Roosevelt suggested they instruct the European Advisory Commission to
report on the problem. Stalin agreed, and since they both evidently felt
strongly on it, Churchill agreed.
However, as Ambassador John G Winant explained, the European Advisory Commission
(EAC) had not taken up the question of partition, because the Russian
representative had always stalled. Morgenthau pointed out that the Teheran
directive to the EAC was evidently not known to the State Department. 'Eden
said,' according to Harry Dexter White's memo, 'there are some groups in both
the United States and in England who feared that Communism would grow in Germany
if a tough policy were pursued by the Allies. This group believed that it was
important to have a strong Germany as protection against possible aggression by
Russia. He said it was a question whether there was a greater danger from a
strong Germany or from a strong Russia. For his part, he believed there was
greater danger from a strong Germany.'
MORGENTHAU RETURNS TO WASHINGTON
Morgenthau had been shocked by the confusion he found in London as to the
treatment of postwar Germany. He made no secret of this upon his return to
Washington. When he visited Cordell Hull in Washington on August 18, the
Secretary of State had to admit he had never been told what was in the minutes
of Teheran. On August 19, Roosevelt confidently assured Morgenthau, 'Give me
thirty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this.' He added, 'We have got to
be tough with Germany and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. You
either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such
a manner so they can't go on reproducing people who want to continue the way
they have in the past.'
Morgenthau now outlined in response what later became his infamous Plan'In his
opinion serious consideration should be given to the desirability and
feasability of reducing Germany to an agrarian economy wherein Germany would be
a land of small farms, without large-scale industrial enterprises.' . Morgenthau
complained, 'Well, Mr President, nobody is considering the question along those
lines in Europe. In England they want to build up Germany so that she can pay
reparations.'
On August 21, the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson dictated in his own diary
(now in Yale University archives) a note that he had talked with Roosevelt's
special adviser Harry L. Hopkins on the telephone: 'He wants me to talk with
Morgenthau on the subject of Germany.' At noon on August 23, Stimson went to the
White House to see the president: 'It is the first time I have seen him since
June. I succeeded in getting through to him my views of the importance of having
a decision on what we are going to do to Germany. I came back to the Department
and Secretary Morgenthau came to lunch with me in my room. I had [John] McCloy
in too. Morgenthau told me of how he had learned in London that the division of
Germany had been agreed upon at Teheran between the three chiefs. Although the
discovery of this thing has been a most tremendous surprise to all of us, I am
not sure that the three chiefs regard it as a fait accompli and in this talk
with Morgenthau it developed that the so-called decision was of a more informal
character than I had understood from McCloy's first report to me of Morgenthau's
news a day or two ago. In the afternoon I settled down and tried to dictate my
ideas in regard to the postwar settlement with Germany.'
In this document, 'Brief for Conference with the President on August 25,'
Stimson listed 'a number of urgent matters of American policy' including the
zones of occupation, the partition of Germany, and in particular the 'policy vs.
liquidation of Hitler and his gang". His wording was very explicit.
'Present instructions seem inadequate beyond imprison-ment. Our officers must
have the protection of definite instructions if shooting required. If shooting
required it must be immediate; not postwar.' He also asked the question, 'How
far do U.S. officers go towards preventing lynching in advance of Law and
Order?'
Meanwhile Morgenthau got at Roosevelt first. Lunching at the White House on
August 23, he sketched out details of his plan for punishing and emasculating
postwar Germany regardless of the effect which this running sore would have on
the rest of Europe. He visited Roosevelt again early on August 25 and handed him
a memorandum on the German problem.
Later that day, Stimson and Morgenthau both lunched with the president. The
Kriegsminister took up the question of the British and American zones of Germany
and urged Roosevelt to allow the British to occupy Northern Germany. 'I further
urged the point,' he recorded in his diary, 'that by taking south-western
Germany we were in a more congenial part of Germany and further away from the
dirty work that the Russians might be doing with the Prussians in Eastern
Germany. I was inclined to think that I had made an impression on him, but it
was impossible to say. I either then or in my former meeting pressed on him the
importance of not partitioning Germany other than the allotment of East Prussia
to Russia or Poland, and Alsace Lorraine to France and a possible allotment to
Silesia to Poland, namely trimming the outer edges of Germany. Other than those
allotments I feared that a division of Germany and a policy which would prevent
her from being industrialized would starve her excess population of 30 million
people, giving again my description of how she had grown during the period
between 1870 and 1914 by virtue of her industralization..'
ROOSEVELT APPOINTS A CABINET COMMITTEE ON GERMANY
Stimson, worried that Allied troops would shortly enter Germany without policy
directives, suggested that Roosevelt appoint a Cabinet committee. The president
accepted the point, and then they went together into Cabinet. Navy secretary
Forrestal wrote a diary on this date.
So did the Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard.
Both were struck by Roosevelt's insistance that the Germans in future live off
soup-kitchens as a punishment. Henry Stimson's diary is also explicit: 'At the
very beginning of Cabinet he brought up this last point and said that he would
appoint Secretaries Hull, Morgenthau and myself as the members of that
committee..' Later Stimson joined Morgenthau at the airport. 'I had the
opportunity of a satisfactory talk with him on matters on which we were inclined
to disagree, namely the use of over-punitive measures on Germany principally
economic. I have been trying to guard against that.'
In a subsequent 'Memorandum of Conversation with the President,' August 25,
Stimson felt that he had made his point that the penalties should be against
individuals and 'not by destruction of the economic structure of Germany which
might have serious results in the future.' 'As to partition, the Secretary
[Stimson] argued for a lopping off of sections rather than a general partition
and thought the President was inclined to agree that Germany should be left as a
self supporting state. The President showed some interest in radical treatment
of the Gestapo.'
For the last days in August Stimson remained on his farm, maintaining scrambler
telephone contact with McCloy in Washington. 'In particular,' wrote Stimson in
his diary, 'I was working up and pressing for the point I had initiated, namely
that we should intern the entire Gestapo and perhaps the S.S. leaders and then
vigorously investigate and try them as the main instruments of Hitler's system
of terrorism in Europe. By so doing I thought we would begin at the right end,
namely the Hitler machine, and punish the people who were directly responsible
for that, carrying the line of investigation and punishment as far as possible.
I found around me, particularly Morgenthau, a very bitter atmosphere of personal
resentment against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt
and I am very much afraid that it will result in our taking mass vengeance on
the part of our people in the shape of clumsy economic action.'
HARRY DEXTER WHITE DRAFTS THE PLAN
Harry Dexter White completed the first draft of the Plan on September 1. Almost
immediately the British embassy learned what Morgenthau was up to.
On September 2, Morgenthau retired to his country home for the Labor Day
weekend, an American public holiday. White sent the completed draft out to him
there. President Roosevelt and his wife motored over from Hyde Park to take tea
with Morgenthau under the trees of his estate at nearby Fishkill and Morgenthau
showed the draft to him.
Roosevelt's thinking on Germany was rather simplistic: no aircraft, uniforms or
marching. Morgenthau had said: 'That's very interesting, Mr President, but I
don't think it goes nearly far enough.' He wanted the Ruhr dismantled and its
machinery given to the needy neighbors; 'I realize this would put 18 or 20
million people out of work,' he conceded airily. But it ought to guarantee the
prosperity of Britain and Belgium for twenty years. Able bodied Germans could be
transported to Central Africa as slave labor on 'some big TVA project.' TVA was
the Tennessee Valley Authority hydroelectric project which Roosevelt's new Deal
had used to generate employment. He went off at a tangent: he was thinking of
re-education of the Germans. 'You will have to create entirely new textbooks,'
he said.
That Monday, September 4, Stimson flew back to Washington and had a conference
with General Marshall that afternoon: 'Discussed with him my troubles in regard
to the treatment of Germany and the method in which we should investigate and
punish the Gestapo.. It was very interesting to find that army officers have a
better respect for the law in those matters than civilians who talk about them
and are anxious to go ahead and chop everybody's head off without trial of
hearing.'
Invited to dine with Morgenthau that evening, Stimson found there McCloy and
Harry White of the Treasury. 'We were all aware of the feeling that a sharp
issue is sure to arise over the question of the treatment of Germany. Morgenthau
is, not unnaturally, very bitter, and as he is not thoroughly trained in history
or even economics it became very apparent that he would plunge out for a
treatment of Germany which I feel sure would be unwise. But we talked the matter
over with temperateness and goodwill during the evening and that was as much as
could be hoped from the situation. We did succeed in settling with perfect
agreement the question of the currency which should be issued in Germany namely
that we should issue Allied military marks at a 10 cent value of the mark.
Morgenthau had first struck for only 5 cents, wishing to use a low rate of the
mark to punish Germany.'
The Cabinet Committee on Germany met for the first time on September 5 in Hull's
office. Hull was cautious. 'We must not lay plans for partition of Germany,' he
pointed out, 'until British and Russian views are known.' Stimson found himself
in a minority. 'This proposal,' he said of Morgenthau's plan, 'will cause
enormous evils. The Germans will be permanent paupers, and the hatreds and
tensions that will develop will obscure the guilt of the Nazis, and poison the
springs of future peace.' 'My plan,' retorted Morgenthau, unabashed, 'will stop
the Germans from every trying to extend their domination by force again. Don't
worry. The rest of Europe can survive without them!'
Stimson was unconvinced. 'This plan will breed war, not prevent it!'
'It's very singular,' he wrote to Marshall. 'I'm the man in charge of the
Department which does the killing in this way, and yet I am the only one who
seems to have any mercy for the other side.' Hull's ideas were no less extreme
than Morgenthau's.
Stimson returned to his office and dictated this note for his diary:
'As soon as I got into the meeting it became very evident that Morgenthau had
been rooting around behind the scenes and had greased the way for his own views
by conference with the president and others. We did get through the question of
the currency alright on the lines which we had decided upon last evening. Then
Hull brought up a draft of agenda.. and as soon as we got into a discussion of
these, I, to my tremendous surprise, found that Hull was as bitter as Morgenthau
against the Germans and was ready to jump all the principles that he had been
laboring for in regard to trade for the past twelve years. He and Morgenthau
wished to wreck completely the immense Ruhr-Saar area of Germany into a second
rate agricultural land regardless of all that that area meant.. Hopkins went
with them so far as to wish to prevent the manufacture of steel.. which would
pretty well sabotage everything else. I found myself a minority of one and I
labored vigorously but entirely ineffectively against my colleagues. In all the
four years that I have been here I have not had such a difficult and unpleasant
meeting although of course there were no personalities. We all knew eachother
too well for that. But we were irreconcilably divided. At the end it was decided
that Hull would send in his memorandum to the President while we should each of
us send a memorandum of views in respect to it.'
Hull had submitted a paper with the title, 'Suggested Recommendations on
Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President.' In his reply
dated September 5, Stimson utterly rejected it. 'I cannot treat as realistic the
suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can
be turned into a non-productive 'ghost territory' when it has become the center
of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples
of energy, vigor and progressiveness.' As for destroying the coalmines, etc, he
added: 'I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dustheap.'
LISTS OF MEN TO LIQUIDATE
The British ambassador Lord Halifax notified the Foreign Office on September 6,
1944, about all this, and asked the poignant question: 'Whom do we shoot or
hang? The feeling is that we should not have great state trials, but proceed
quickly and with despatch. The English idea, once preferred but then withdrawn,
was to give the Army lists to liquidate on mere identification. What has
happened to this idea? Besides individuals, what categories should be shot?'.
On the same day, September 6, Roosevelt called the Committee to a sudden
conference at the White House.
Stimson wrote,
'After what had happened yester- day I.. expected to be steam-rollered by the
whole bunch. But the meeting went off better than I had expected. The
President.. then took up the question of German economy, looking at me and
reverting to his proposition made at Cabinet a week or two ago that Germany
could live happily and peacefully on soup from soup kitchens if she couldn't
make money for herself. He said that our ancestors had lived successfully and
happily in the absence of many luxuries that we would now deem necessities.. As
he addressed his remarks to me, I took the chance and tried to drive in the fact
that the one point that had been at issue in our yesterday's preparatory meeting
of the Committee had been the proposition that the Ruhr and the Saar a plot of
non-industrial agricultural land.. I said I was utterly opposed to the
destruction of such a great gift of nature and that it should be used for the
reconsturction of the world which sorely needed it now.. Morgenthau had
submitted through Hull a memorandum giving his program towards Germany and it
had reiterated what he had put forth verbally, namely a complete obliteration of
the industrial powers of the Ruhr.. I pointed this out and said that this was
what I was opposed to. The President apparently took my side on this but he
mentioned the fact that Great Britain was going to be in sore straits after the
war and he thought that the products of the Ruhr might be used to furnish raw
material for British steel industry. I said that I had no objection certainly to
assisting Britain every way that we could, but that this was very different from
obliterating the Ruhr as had been proposed.. I wound up by using the analogy of
Charles Lamb's dissertation on roast pig. I begged the President to remember
that this was a most complicated economic question and all that I was urging
upon him was that he should not burn down his house of the world for the purpose
of getting a meal of roast pig. He apparently caught the point.'
On September 7, Stimson showed to General Marshall the memorandum he had written
about Germany. '[Marshall] thoroughly approved the position I have taken of
temperate treatment economically of the Saar-Ruhr area as being the only
possible thing for us to do. I also showed them the memorandum which I received
from Morgenthau demanding that the leaders of the Nazi party be shot without
trial and on the basis of the general world appreciation of their guilt, and it
met with the reception that I expectedabsolute rejection of the notion that we
should not give these men a fair trial.. But at 11:45 I heard from McCloy that
Morgenthau still sticks to his guns and has been to the president again and has
demanded a re-hearing.'
Stimson began looking for allies too. 'Dinner with Mabel [Stimson] and [Felix]
Frankfurter. Frankfurter was helpful as I knew he would be. Although a Jew like
Morgenthau, he approached this subject with perfect detachment and great
helpfulness. I went over the whole matter with him from the beginning with him,
reading him Morgenthau's views on the subject of the Ruhr and also on the
subject of the trial of the Nazis, at both of which he snorted with astonishment
and disdain. He fully backed up my views and those of my fellows in the Army,..
these men the substance of a fair trial and that they cannot be railroaded to
their death without trial.'
Now, by September 9, the full Morgenthau Plan was ready. At a meeting that day
with FDR, Henry Stimson laid into it. 'Instead of having a two hour conference
with the President,' wrote Stimson, 'as Secretary Morgenthau had asked for, our
conference boiled down to about forty-five minutes and that was taken up mainly
by the President's own discursive questions and remarks.. Morgenthau appeared
with a new diatribe on the subject of the Nazis and an enlargement of his
previous papers as to how to deal with them. Hull took no leading part as
chairman but sat silent with very little to say. The President addressed most of
his remarks to me and about the only things that I can remember were (1) that he
asserted his predilection for feeding the Germans from soup kitchens instead of
anything heavier, and (2) he wanted to be protected from the expected revolution
in France. Those are the two obsessions that he has had on his mind on this
whole subject as far as I could see.'
Morgenthau's record shows that Roosevelt said he wanted Germany partitioned into
three parts. He flipped through the pages of Morgenthau's memorandum, and kept
prodding Morgenthau: 'Where is the ban on uniforms and marching?' Morgenthau
reassured him it was all there.
At one point FDR exclaimed, 'Furthermore I believe in an agricultural Germany,'
he said. This conference behind him, Roosevelt, as Stimson later put it,
'pranced up to the meeting at Quebec,' leaving Hull and Stimson behind. On
September 12 he cabled to Morgenthau, 'Please be in Quebec by Thursday September
14th noon.' In a looseleaf folder Morgenthau took his Plan up to Quebec with
him.
'BIASSED BY SEMITIC GRIEVANCES'
Stimson was astonished to hear that Roosevelt had asked Morgenthau up to Quebec.
'While he has the papers we have written on the subject with him,' Stimson
recorded on September 13, 'he has not invited any further discussion on the
matter with us. Instead apparently today he has invited Morgenthau up, or
Morgenthau has got himself invited. I cannot believe that he will follow
Morgenthau's views. If he does, it will certainly be a disaster.' And on
September 14, the Kriegsminister wrote, 'It is an outrageous thing. Here the
President appoints a Committee with Hull as its Chairman for the purpose of
advising him in regard to these questions in order that it may be done with full
deliberation and, when he goes off to Quebec, he takes the man who really
represents the minority and is so biassed by his Semitic grievances that he is
really a very dangerous adviser to the President at this time. Hull.. is left
behind.'
THE CONFERENCE AT QUEBEC, SEPTEMBER 1944
At Quebec both Churchill and Roosevelt were ill men. Churchill was kept going
only with M&B sulphona- mide-type drugs. Roosevelt's great brain had already
deteriorated so far that at one banquet in August he had proposed a toast to the
same the Icelandic prime minister twice in twenty minutes.
Both were putty in the hands of evil men. Roosevelt camouflaged his withering
brain with carefree bonhomie. On September 13, he would turn to his loathsome
dog Falla and command, pointing at Morgenthau, 'say hello to your Uncle Henry.'
The two leaders reached Quebec early on September 11. In fact Roosevelt's train
had pulled into the railroad station fifteen minutes before Churchill's train
(10:15 AM), by design rather than accident, as he confessed to the Canadian
prime minister with a candour that left Mackenzie King gasping in his diary, 'It
seemed to me that the President was rather assuming that he was in his own
country.' Roosevelt was much thinner in his body and face, had lost around
thirty pounds in weight, his eyes were drawn, his haggard face had sunless
pallor, and to his shocked host Mackenzie King he looked distinctly older and
worn. The electioneering abuse on him as 'a senile old man' had etched deeply
into him.* Churchill told Mackenzie King that it was wonderful what Canada was
doing in the war, and he particularly praised the latest financial aid given by
Canada to Britain, and that he recognized that Canada had had to cover up in a
way in order to give what she had. (Mackenzie Kiary, Sept 11, 1944).
As he told Mackenzie King at the end of his stay, Britain would never forget how
Canada had helped: 'Really,' he said, 'we are the one debtor nation that will
come out of the war.' Now Britain had to expand her export trade and build up
her industries. 'I understand that it has to be kept secret for the present,'
Churchill said, referring to Canada's financial aid to Britain. They lunched in
the Citadel and talked about the war's personalities, about de Gaulle and
Chiang-Kai-shek; Churchill flattered F.D.R. that he was head of the strongest
military power on earth, both in the air, at sea and on the land.
Churchill looked better, and was getting to grips with some Scotch as well as a
couple of brandies. It was hard for even the Canadian hosts to find out about
Churchill's and Roosevelt's intentions. Mackenzie King himself was tired and his
eyes and body were aching with old age. After luncheon, Mrs Roosevelt wheeled
the president over in his wheelchair to see the models Churchill had brought
from England of the D-day invasion equipmenta gift for the Hyde Park library. As
Roosevelt leaned forward to see them there were beads of perspiration on his
forehead. Then he was wheeled away for an afternoon rest. Sir John Dill took
Mackenzie King aside and told him he believed that Churchill 'enjoyed' this war.
'It is clear,' agreed Mackenzie King, 'that it is the very breath of life to
him.'
On the following day, September 13, it began raining around noon. Morgenthau
arrived at Quebec. The problem looming over the conference was of financing the
war effort. Canada was now being asked to commit her forces for the South
Pacific, but Mackenzie King saw immense political difficulties in further
Imperial wars Canadians would never agree that their taxes should be spent
fighting to protect India or recover Burma and Singapore. Roosevelt sneered to
Morgenthau that he 'knew now' why the British wanted to join in the war in the
Pacific. 'All they want is Singapore back.'
* Diaries of Mackenzie King, H.H. Arnold; Leahy, etc.
That evening, September 13, FDR and Churchill stayed at the dinner table at the
Citadel. At 8 pm on September 13, Churchill dined with FDR, Morgenthau,
Cherwell, and other members of their staff. Mackenzie King left at 9 pm and he
found them still sitting there, talking at 11:30 pm. 'Churchill was immediately
opposite the President,' Mackenzie King described in his diary, 'and both of
them seemed to be speaking to the numbers assembled which included Morgenthau,
Lord Cherwell, Lord Leathers, Lord Moran and two or three others. Morgenthau
arrived this afternoon. Anthony Eden is to arrive in the morning.'
Morgenthau's papers show that they talked about Germany. Churchill irritably
said, 'What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without
first discussing them with me?' FDR explained that this was why Morgenthau had
come up from Washington. Tomorrow Morgenthau would talk privately with Cherwell
about it. Churchill challenged FDR: 'Why don't we discuss Germany now?' so
Roosevelt asked Morgenthau to outline his plan. Remarkably, Churchill's first
reaction was hostile. When the Treasury Secretary embarked on the details of
dismantling the Ruhr, Churchill was shocked and interrupted him. He was flatly
opposedall that was necessary was to eliminate German arms production. Doing
what Morgenthau proposed, Churchill waspishly told Roosevelt's Treasury
Secretary, who was a Jew, would 'unnatural, un-Christian and unnecessary.' He
doubted it would help even if all Germany's former steel markets went to
Britain. 'I regard the Morgenthau Plan,' he said with heavy sarcasm, 'with as
much enthusiasm as I would handcuffing myself to a dead German.' He was
truculent, even offensive, rasping at one point to Roosevelt in particular, 'Is
this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?' And at
another, to the American representatives in general: 'If you do not do something
for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy gold and do business
largely within the Empire.' The Prof glowered at his prime minister, but Admiral
Leahy, the president's chief of staff, sided with Churchill. F.D.R. kept quiet.
That was his way. He had done his footwork behind the scenes. Once, the
conversation switched to India and stayed there for an hour. Churchill was angry
at FDR's refusal to understand the administration problems faced by the British
in a subcontinent where the birth and death rates were high, and the people were
careless of poverty and ignorant of disease. 'I'll give the United States half
of India to admi- nister,' Churchill flung at F.D.R., 'and we will take the
other half. And then we'll see who does better.'
Surprised at Churchill's hostility to the Plan, Lord Cherwell suspected that WSC
had not wholly grasped what Morgenthau was driving at. In a private tête-à-tête
the next morning (September 14) he apologized profusely for Winston's behaviour
over dinner, promised Morgenthau that he would try to dress up the Plan in a way
more attractive to the Prime Minister.
Churchill got the message, wrote later: 'We had much to ask from Mr Morgenthau.'
When FDR and Churchill discussed policy toward Germany later that day Churchill
now declared himself in favour of the Plan, as outlined to him by Lord Cherwell.
Cherwell was instructed to draft a memorandum for signature and give it to
Churchill.
At one point Mackenzie King asked how long the war was going to last. Churchill
said he feared that it might drag on -- the Germans might hold out in the Alps
or elsewhere. 'Hitler and his crowd know that their lives are at stake,' he
said, 'so they will fight to the bitter end. This may mean that at some time we
have to take the position that the war is really won, and that what is still
going on anew is just mopping up groups here and there.' On the question of what
to do with Germany, Churchill said that there would not be any attempt to
control the country immediately by Allied forces. The Germans would have to
police their own people. 'They are a race that loves that sort of thing,' he
said. 'To be given any little authority, once they are beaten, and to wield it
over others.' He envisaged something like centralized stations (FLAKTURME?) on
towers around the different cities. If there was any difficulty from the Germans
they could be threatened with a local bombardment. If the difficulty kept up
they could be given a very effective bombardment from the skies. 'He did not
contemplate continued active fighting,' recorded Mackenzie King after this
discussion.
Churchill took a nap at the Citadel, dreaming deeply, and arrived late for
dinner. 'I have been thousands of miles away,' he apologized. He sat opposite
Roosevelt and Morgenthau. A few hours earlier Anthony Eden, summoned by
Churchill from London, had arrived at Quebec. He sat to Roosevelt's left, worn
out by the eighteen-hour flight in a Liberator bomber. Churchill was in good
spirit, the Canadian premier was pleased to see how well he was looking, and
surmised it was because of the scarcity of alcohol.
Out of earshot of Churchill and Eden, at 11:00 a.m. on September 15, Morgenthau
invited Lord Cherwell and Harry Dexter White to his room, read the Prof's draft
and disliked it. It represented 'two steps backwards,' he said. Since the last
discussion, he said, Churchill had seemed to accept the Plan, and had himself
spoken promisingly of turning Germany into an agricultural state as she had been
in the last quarter of the 19th century. Morgenthau urged them to scrap this
draft, and return to the two leaders for fresh instructions.
When Churchill met Roosevelt, in the presence of Henry Morgenthau and Harry
Dexter White, an hour later at noon September 15, Britain's financial problems
were clearly uppermost in his own mind, rather than the future of Germany.
Roosevelt read through the draft Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II, and approved
it with a minor change.
But each time he seemed about to sign it, he kept interrupting with a fresh
anecdote -- he was in one of his talky moods, as Morgenthau described them.
Churchill was unable to contain himself. 'What do you want me to do,' he
exclaimed nervously. 'Get on my hind legs and beg like Falla?'.
FDR enjoyed every moment of Churchill's -- Britain's -- humiliating plight. But
eventually he signed: OK, FDR. Churchill added: WC, 15.9. (A copy of the
document is also in the Forrestal papers; and cf Leahy diary, October 19, 1944.)
It was a load off Churchill's mind. He became quite emotional and Morgenthau saw
tears in the old man's eyes. After the signing he thanked Roosevelt effusively,
and said that it was something they were doing for both countries.
CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT INITIAL THE MORGENTHAU PLAN
Still at this noon conference on September 15, 1944, and feeling in generous
mood, Churchill turned to Lord Cherwell. 'Where are the minutes on this matter
of the Ruhr?' he asked the Prof. The Prof and Morgenthau had agreed to say they
did not have them -- because the American, on reading Cherwell's draft, had felt
the text was too milk-and-water. ('I thought we could get Churchill to go much
further,' he noted afterwards.)
Churchill was annoyed at this lapse. Roosevelt humorously observed that the
document was not ready because Morgenthau had 'interspersed the previous
discussion with too many dirty stories.'
'Well,' Churchill interrupted impatiently, 'I'll restate it.' He did so
forcefully. Then he invited the Prof and Morgenthau to leave the room and
dictate the memorandum anew.
When the two men walked back in, the new draft still did not suit Churchill's
new temperament. 'No,' he said, 'that won't do at all.' Morgenthau's heart sank,
but then he heard Churchill add, 'It's not drastic enough. Let me show you what
I want.' He asked for his stenographer, then himself dictatedrather well, as
Morgenthau thought.
'At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best
measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential
feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.'
Among those listening was Eden. Eden was going white about the gills. He was
hearing this for the first time.
'The ease,' continued Churchill, 'with which the metallurgical, chemical and
electric industries..'
'In Germany,' interposed Roosevelt, because he had in mind the whole of Germany,
and not just the Ruhr and Saar industries.
'The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in
Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by
bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a
large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and
it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be
entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they
have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would
therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the
two districts should be put under somebody under the World Organization which
would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were
not started up again by some subterfuge.
'This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the
Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily
agricultural and pastoral in its character.
'The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.'
Eden was horrified. He exclaimed to Churchill, 'You can't do this. After all,
you and I publicly have said quite the opposite.'
A row broke out between the two men. It got quite nasty. But Churchill kept
arguing that this was the only way to steal Germany's export market. 'How do you
know what it is or where it is,' snapped Eden, and Churchill testily retorted:
'Well, we will get it wherever it is.' He took a pen and initialled the
document. Roosevelt had already done the same. 'O.K. FDR' and 'WC, 15.9.'
'SEMITISM GONE WILD'
Copies went to London immediately for the War Cabinet. There is no doubt about
it. Typed on long green telegram sheets, it is to be found among Eden's private
papers at Birmingham University, and Lord Cherwell's papers at Oxford
university.
Copies were circulated to the ministries in Washington as well.* On September 15
Roosevelt sent it to Hull, prefaced by the explanation: 'After many long
conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the
general matter of post-war plans regarding industries has been worked out as per
the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will
approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.'
Knowing that Eden would return to London before him, Churchill turned to his
foreign secretary: 'Now I hope, Anthony,' he said, you're not going to do
anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.
After all, the future of my people is at stake and when I have to choose between
my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.'
For the rest of the day Eden sulked and brooded. Morgenthau was delighted,
particularly by the unexpected bonus that Churchill had himself dictated the
infamous memorandum. He could hardly later disavow it. Afterwards Morgenthau
lunched with Lord Cherwell. That afternoon -- it was still September 15, 1944 --
Roosevelt looked at the Combined Chiefs of Staff map of postwar Germany and
found it 'terrible,' as he told Morgenthau. He took three colored pencils and
sketched where he wanted the British and American armies to go in Germany. He
waited until the PM was in a good humor and everything else settled, then showed
the map to him. Churchill approved it.
Admiral Leahy was also pleased with it, explaining to Morgenthau that since the
British were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar, they would have the odium of
carrying the Morgenthau plan out. Henry Stimson, isolated on his estate by a
hurricane that weekend, now learned of Morgenthau's triumph at Quebec. He wrote
in his diary, 'On Saturday or Sunday [September 16-17] I learned from McCloy
over the long distance telephone that the President has sent a decision flatly
against us in regard to the treatment of Germany. Apparently he has gone over
completely to the Morgenthau proposition and has gotten Churchill and Lord
Cherwell with them. But the situation is a serious one and the cloud of it has
hung over me pretty heavily over the weekend. It is a terrible thing to think
that the total power of the United States and the United Kingdom in such a
critical matter as this is in the hands of two men, both of whom are similar in
their impulsiveness and their lack of systematic study.I have yet to meet a man
who is not horrified with the "Carthaginian" attitude of the Treasury. It is
Semitism gone wild for vengeance and, if it is ultimately carried out (I can't
believe that it will be) it as sure as fate will lay the seeds for another war
in the next generation. And yet these two men in a brief conference at Quebec
with nobody to advise them except "yes-men," with no Cabinet officer with the
President except Morgenthau, have taken this step and given directions for it to
be carried out.'
* Copies of this are in, inter alia, (Dwight D Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower
files, Box 152, Morgenthau Plan.; ibid., Box 76, Morgenthau; Henry Morgenthau's
book, 'Germany is Our Problem,' New York, 1945; Cherwell papers; Foreign office,
files, London; Forrestal diary, October 20 ("Morgenthau.. handed me a copy");
Morgenthau papers, diary, pp.1454-5, September 15, 1944.
THE END OF THE CONFERENCE
At noon on the sixteenth, calling at the Citadel for a final joint meeting with
Roosevelt and Churchill, airforce commander General Arnold thought that the
President looked 'very badly.' 'He did not have the pep, power of concentration,
could not make his usual wisecracks, seemed to be thinking of something else.
Closed his eyes to rest more than usual.' (Arnold diary).
Roosevelt left that evening for his Hyde Park estate, joined there by Churchill
early on the eighteenth. On September 18, Churchill and Roosevelt signed their
secret agreement on the atomic bomb: 'It might perhaps, after mature
consideration, be used against the Japanese;' and there was to be 'full
collaboration between the United States and the British Government' in its
postwar development and commerical exploitation. (Since neither Churchill's nor
Roosevelt's successors knew of this secret agreement, it would remain unhonoured.)
After dinner on September 19 Churchill left for Staten Island by train and
boarded the Queen Mary off New York the next morning for the return journey to
England. Lord Cherwell, his eminence grise, remained in Washington. Roosevelt
was still under Morgenthau's influence. On September 20, John McCloy told
Stimson, who wrote it in his diary, that he had heard from Halifax and Sir Alec
Cadogan that the president was 'very firm for shooting the Nazi leaders without
trial.' After Quebec, the Washington campaign against the Morgenthau Plan
stepped up. McCloy showed it to Forrestal, the Navy Secretary.
Both Stimson and Hull carried protests to the President against it. On September
20, Morgenthau proudly related to Secretaries Stimson and Hull how he had
obtained the initials of Roosevelt and Churchill on his Declaration. Stimson and
Hull both gained the impression that the president had not read what he had so
easily initialled. On September 22 there was a discussion between Roosevelt,
Bush, Leahy and Lord Cherwell. The last-named wrote a handwritten note. After
discussion of the atomic bomb project ("Tube Alloys") the conversation passed to
more general topics.
'P[resident] said that the British Empire, in its struggle against fascism, had
got into terrible economic trouble. It was a U.S. interest to help Britain over
that trouble and see that she became once more completely solvent and able to
pay her way. In fact to put it bluntly the U.S. could not afford to see the
British Empire go bankrupt. For this reason it was essential to increase Great
Britain's exports. It had been decided at Q[uebec]though he did not know when
this would be announced or whether it would simply be allowed to leak out later
that in the interests of world security German war-making potential in the Ruhr
and the Saar would be extinguished and those regions put under international
control. In fact Germany should revert definitely to a more agricultural habit.
This would leave a gap in the export markets which the U.K. might well fill to
general advantage. It might be that some high minded people would disapprove,
but he found it hard to be high minded vis-à-vis the Germans when he thought of
all they had done.'
Almost overnight, Roosevelt changed his mind. What changed it for him, was
probably the leakage of the Morgenthau Plan to the newspapers, published in
great detail on September 23 by the Wall Street Journal. Roosevelt covered his
tracks as best he could. Pulling out all the stops, Morgenthau sent a copy of
the full-length Plan round to Lord Cherwell at his Washington hotel on September
26, asking him to show it to Churchill.
But the opposition was stiffening. To Stimson's surprise, on the 27th Roosevelt
himself telephoned on the scrambler telephone. 'He.. was evidently under the
influence of the impact of criticism which has followed his decision to follow
Morgenthau's advice. The papers have taken it up violently and almost
unanimously against Morgenthau and the President himself, and the impact has
been such that he had already reached a conclusion that he had made a false step
and was trying to work out of it. He told me that he didn't really intend to try
to make Germany a purely agricultural country but said that his underlying
motive was the very confidential one that England was broke; that something must
be done to give her more business to pull out after the war, and he evidently
hoped that by something like the Morgenthau Plan Britain might inherit Germany's
Ruhr business.'
The five biggest American engineering unions issued a declaration on September
29 dismissing the Plan as economically unsound and warning that it 'contained
the seeds of a new war.' Politically, the Morgenthau Plan was a disaster.
Roosevelt was coming up to a new presidential election in a few weeks' time. On
October 3, lunching with Stimson, he remarked: 'You know, Morgenthau pulled a
boner. Don't let's be apart on that. I have no intention of turning Germany into
an agrarian state.' Stimson thereupon produced a copy of the Declaration and
read the appropriate lines from it. Roosevelt listened in horror. He had no idea
how he could have agreed to such proposals. At a meeting the same day with Lord
Cherwell, Harry Hopkins said to the Prof: 'Be careful with Cordell Hull. He is
very annoyed at Henry Morgenthau's intervention in the plans for the treatment
of Germany. He has no doubt at all that you supported Morgenthau because you
were anxious to get the Lend-Lease negotiations through.'